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I.  INTRODUCTION 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., asks whether Article III’s 
restriction on the jurisdiction of the federal courts only to “cases” and 
“controversies,”1 as required by the “actual controversy” limitation of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act,2 necessitates that a patent licensee 
terminate or breach its license agreement before seeking a 
declaratory judgment to hold the underlying patent invalid, 
unenforceable, or not infringed. The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, the appellate court responsible for hearing all patent appeals, 
had established that a company licensing a patent must infringe a 
patent, which risks subjecting the licensee to treble damages, in order 
to challenge the validity of that patent in court to prevent a licensee 
from hedging its bets by simultaneously paying for the patent license 
and challenging the patent’s validity.3 
Justice Scalia, writing for an eight-member majority, rejected the 
argument advanced by Genentech—that MedImmune, Inc., could not 
sue because it had voluntarily entered into the licensing agreement 
with Genentech and continued to pay all required royalty payments—
 
 * 2007 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1993). 
 3. See generally Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (patent 
licensee must breach or terminate license to challenge the validity of the licensed patent). 
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and overruled the Federal Circuit’s precedent.4 Instead, the Court 
held that a challenge to the validity of a patent is now a justiciable 
controversy for which a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction, 
regardless of whether the licensee first breaches the licensing 
agreement.5 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
MedImmune, Inc., the petitioner, is a biotechnology company that 
produces and markets a drug used to prevent potentially fatal 
respiratory disease in infants and young children.6 This drug, 
distributed under the trademarked name “Synagis,” accounts for more 
than eighty percent of petitioner’s sales revenue since 1999.7 In 1997, 
one year before Synagis was marketed, petitioner entered into a 
licensing agreement with the respondent, Genentech, Inc.8 Under the 
licensing agreement, the petitioner agreed to pay royalties to the 
respondent if it sold any products covered by one of the licensed 
patents, including the “Cabilly II” patent held by the respondent, 
which was ultimately challenged and resulted in this case.9  
Following the signing of the licensing agreement, Genentech 
delivered a letter to MedImmune stating its belief that the product 
Synagis fell under the Cabilly II patent and, therefore, royalties 
should be paid in accordance with the terms of the licensing 
agreement.10 This letter clearly threatened that Genentech would seek 
to enforce the Cabilly II patent. Although MedImmune did not 
believe the Cabilly II patent was valid and enforceable, it feared the 
potential costs if Genentech succeeded in enforcing the license 
agreement or enjoining the sale of Synagis. MedImmune was 
confronted with a difficult decision: continue to pay royalties despite 
feeling that they were not owed or breach the licensing agreement 
and challenge the validity of the patent. Fearful of the serious 
consequences associated with breaching or terminating the licensing 
agreement, especially the risk of treble damages, MedImmune paid all 
 
 4. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 767. 
 7. Id. at 768. 
 8. Id. at 767–68. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 768. 
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royalties requested by Genentech, but did so “under protest and with 
reservation of all [its] rights.”11 
MedImmune subsequently filed suit against Genentech in the 
United States District Court for the District of Central California, 
seeking a declaratory judgment to declare the Cabilly II patent 
unenforceable or invalid. At the same time, MedImmune continued to 
pay all demanded royalties under protest.12 The district court granted 
Genentech’s motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment claims for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.13 In doing so, the district court 
relied on Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.14 The Federal Circuit had held 
in Gen-Probe that a patent licensee in good standing cannot establish 
an Article III case or controversy with regard to validity, 
enforceability, or scope of a patent because the presence of a license 
agreement “obliterate[s] any reasonable apprehension” that the 
licensee will be sued for infringement.15 Although the district court 
intimated that it had “serious misgivings” about the practical 
application of the Gen-Probe rule, it concluded there were not 
sufficient facts to distinguish the case from the facts of Gen-Probe.16 
Therefore, the court was obligated to follow precedent and dismissed 
Medimmune’s case.17 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, also 
citing Gen-Probe as the binding precedent.18 
The Federal Circuit’s 2004 Gen-Probe decision required a licensee 
to breach or terminate the licensing agreement in order to bring a 
challenge to the patent’s validity because this was seen as creating an 
actual controversy.19 However, a landmark 1969 Supreme Court case, 
Lear v. Adkins, held that patent licensees are not barred from 
challenging the validity of the patents they have licensed simply by 
virtue of the contractual relationship created by the licensing 
 
 11. Id. at 768 (quoting Joint Appendix 426). 
 12. Id. at 767–68. 
 13. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 03-2567 MRP (CTX), 2004 WL 3770589 
(C.D. Cal., Apr. 26, 2004). 
 14. Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 15. Id. at 1381. 
      16.   See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 03-2567 MRP (CTX), 2004 WL 
3770589, at *6 (C.D. Cal., Apr. 26, 2004) (“Even if it has serious misgivings about the panel's 
conclusion, this Court is not free to reconsider policy ramifications that Gen-Probe rejected. 
There are no relevant facts that distinguish this case from the facts of Gen-Probe.”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 964–965 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 19. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1382. 
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agreement.20 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. provided an 
opportunity to reconcile these differences. 
III.  HOLDING 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to decide if 
termination or breach of a licensing agreement is a necessary 
precondition to bring a suit challenging the validity or enforceability 
of a patent. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. offered the Supreme 
Court an opportunity to clarify the legal landscape in an evolving area 
of intellectual property law. In amicus briefs, many large companies 
with extensive portfolios of patented intellectual property argued the 
licensor’s position that a licensee cannot retain the benefit of the 
licensing agreement by paying all necessary fees while simultaneously 
challenging the agreement’s validity in court. On the other side, the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Justice Department, the 
General Pharmaceuticals Association, and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council filed amicus briefs for the licensee.21 The Justice 
Department argued that invalid patents hurt efficient licensing, hinder 
competition, and undermine incentives for innovation.22 The efficiency 
arguments were persuasive and led eight members of the Court to 
find for the licensee. However, the opinion focused almost entirely on 
the jurisdictional issue. An eight-member majority opinion found that 
courts have jurisdiction in this case. The sole dissenter was Justice 
Thomas. 
The main issue before the Court was whether MedImmune 
alleged a contractual dispute.23 In order to discuss subject matter 
jurisdiction, the majority opinion first clarified the underlying “nature 
 
 20. Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673–74 (1969). 
 21. Alex Lash, Patent Ruling Roils Biotech World, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 11, 2007. 
 22. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, MedImmune, 
127 S. Ct. 764 (No. 05-608); see generally Federal Trade Comm’n, “To Promote Innovation: The 
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy” (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited January 10, 2007); U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property” (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (last visited 
January 10, 2007); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Report of the Department of Justice’s Task 
Force on Intellectual Property” (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/ip_task_force_ 
report.pdf (last visited January 10, 2007). 
 23. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, MedImmune, 
127 S. Ct. 764 (No. 05-608). 
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of the case.”24 Although not an issue for the Court, Scalia’s opinion 
dismisses Genentech’s contention that no factual dispute existed 
regarding whether Synagis infringed the Cabilly II patent.25 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia challenged the respondent’s allegation 
that royalties are due under the licensing agreement for an infringing 
product whether or not the underlying patent is valid.26 
Delving into the jurisdictional question, the Court discussed the 
requirements of Article III and the Declaratory Judgment Act. Article 
III of the Constitution limits judicial power for the adjudication of 
cases only to “cases” or “controversies.” In the past, the Court 
interpreted this requirement as limiting federal court jurisdiction only 
to cases in which resolution is “in a concrete factual context 
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial 
action” and “outside “the rarefied atmosphere of a debating society.”27 
In other words, the judiciary’s function is not to opine on hypothetical 
disputes. The Declaratory Judgment Act, in accordance with the 
strictures of Article III, permits federal court decisions only “[i]n a 
case of actual controversy.”28 The Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act in Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Haworth, where it limited justiciability to controversies that 
“are such in the constitutional sense.”29 A constitutionally justiciable 
controversy is not abstract, hypothetical, academic, or moot.30 There 
must be adequate circumstances to prove “there is a substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of 
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
 
 24. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 769. 
 25. Id. (“The first point simply does not comport with the allegations of petitioner’s 
amended complaint. The very first count requested a ‘DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS,’ and stated that petitioner ‘disputes its 
obligation to make payments under the 1997 License Agreement because [petitioner’s] sale of 
its Synagis product does not infringe any valid claim of the [Cabilly II] Patent.’) (citations 
omitted). 
 26. Id. at 769–70 (“We express no opinion on whether a nonrepudiating licensee is similarly 
relieved of its contract obligation during a successful challenge to a patent’s validity.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 27. Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1993). 
 29. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). 
 30. Id. at 240-41 (citing U.S. v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920)). 
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declaratory judgment.”31 In other words, there must be a real, 
immediate legal dispute between adverse parties. 
The crux of this case was whether there was an actual controversy 
sufficient to meet the requirements of Article III and the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. The Court pointed out that petitioner clearly would 
have met these requirements “if petitioner had taken the final step of 
refusing to pay royalty payments under the 1997 license agreement.”32 
Theoretically, if MedImmune continued to make royalty payments it 
would not yet be vulnerable to immediate harm by way of a suit for 
enforcement or an enjoinment of the sale of its products. Without the 
immediacy of harm, the matter’s justiciability was uncertain because 
no actual controversy creating subject matter jurisdiction had yet 
arisen.33 But for the petitioner continuing to make royalty payments 
under protest, there would be an actual controversy and all of the 
necessary elements were present for proper judicial resolution of the 
dispute. 
Justice Scalia drew an analogy to this problem by comparing it to 
a more familiar occurrence, a suit for a declaratory judgment under 
threat of action by the government. Often, such actions occur in the 
First Amendment context. For example, a petitioner need not breach 
a law banning the distribution of handbills before bringing a suit to 
challenge its basis.34 In such a circumstance, the challenge is justiciable 
regardless of whether the handbills were ever distributed or if the 
petitioner ever faced prosecution. This is because “the declaratory 
judgment procedure is an alternative to pursuit of the arguably illegal 
activity.”35 Thus, an individual seeking declaratory relief against 
government action can continue to abide by the law while 
simultaneously challenging the validity of that law. 
Although declaratory judgments by private parties against the 
government in the mentioned example, there are few Supreme Court 
cases interpreting the Declaratory Judgment Act as applied to two 
 
 31. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). 
 32. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 127 S. Ct. 764, 771–72 (2007). 
 33. Id. at 772 n. 8 (“The justiciability problem that arises, when the party seeking 
declaratory relief is himself preventing the complained-of injury from occurring, can be 
described in terms of standing . . . or in terms of ripeness.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 480 (1974) (J. Rehnquist, concurring)). 
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private parties. In fact, the majority only located one case, Altvater v. 
Freeman,36 which was decided over sixty years ago. 
Altvater’s fact pattern bears striking similarities to MedImmune. 
Like MedImmune, Altvater involved a licensee who paid royalties 
under protest and simultaneously sought a declaratory judgment to 
find the underlying patents invalid. The Court held there was a 
justiciable case or controversy despite the fact that royalties were 
being paid. If the licensee were not allowed to challenge the patent 
while continuing to pay royalties, the only alternative would be to 
bring suit and “risk not only actual but treble damages in 
infringement suits.”37 The Court held that requiring a licensee to 
breach a licensing agreement in order to challenge the validity of the 
underlying patent was too burdensome on the licensee. If payments 
are made in response to coercive behavior, those payments are not 
seen as eliminating all controversies. Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc. was 
decided with this case in mind. In Gen-Probe, the Federal Circuit 
limited the scope of Altvater’s holding to only those situations where a 
threat of injunction exists. In MedImmune, the Court determines that 
the Federal Circuit read the Altvater holding too narrowly.38 
Like the suit against the government, the Court held that a dispute 
between two private parties over the validity of a licensing agreement 
meets the jurisdictional requirements of Article III and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act. The parties’ dispute is real and immediate 
because both sides disagree about their legal obligations to one 
another.39 Although the petitioner continued to pay the royalties that 
were allegedly due under the licensing agreement, it only did so 
because of the enormous gamble associated with having to breach the 
agreement in order to challenge the validity of the underlying patent. 
To require the petitioner to “bet the farm, or (as here) risk treble 
damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business before seeking a 
declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in 
Article III.”40  
Furthermore, the existence of a licensing agreement does not 
preclude the contracting party from challenging the validity of the 
 
 36. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943). 
 37. Id. at 365. 
 38. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774. 
 39. Id. at 768–69. 
 40. Id. at 775. 
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intellectual property at issue. A valid licensing agreement 
memorializing a promise to pay royalties does not represent a 
guarantee that the licensee will not seek a court order holding the 
underlying patents invalid.41  
Finally, the majority declined to apply the common law principle 
of contracts that one “cannot at one and the same time challenge [a 
contract’s] validity and continue to reap its benefits.”42 The Court 
found that to reach this common law doctrine would be to decide the 
case on the merits, while the case before the Court in MedImmune 
simply dealt with the jurisdictional question. 
IV.  IMPACT AND CONCLUSION 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. takes an aggressive stand in 
favor of policing the patent system by allowing the courts to grant 
declaratory relief before a licensee ceases to pay royalties. Some 
observers have alleged that the Patent and Trademark Office is 
overburdened, causing it to grant many patents of questionable 
validity.43 By allowing licensees to challenge these questionable 
patents without having to “bet the farm,” MedImmune encourages the 
use of litigation and market mechanisms to establish the validity of 
patents and intellectual property. Although less efficient than denying 
a patent outright at the application stage, the decision removes some 
of the deadweight loss associated with patents whose validity is never 
challenged because licensees would rather play it safe than risk treble 
damages. Because licensees are often the only parties with the 
financial incentives to challenge a patent’s validity, they are likely the 
most appropriate party to bring a challenge. This is consistent with a 
rising tide of patent “reform” bills that have recently been proposed 
at the congressional level, which are aimed at increasing the 
availability of post-grant review of patents.44 
 
 41. Id. at 776. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Press Release, Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, “MedImmune v. Genentech: A Dilemma 
Removed for Patent Licensees” (Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://www.cooley.com/news/ 
alerts.aspx?ID=40494620. 
 44. See, e.g., H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (“Patent Reform Act of 2005”) (which would 
strengthen allowable procedures for the review of patents after they are granted by the Patent 
and Trademark Office). 
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By removing a procedural hurdle, the decision also helps protect 
smaller companies who may be exploited by larger companies with 
stronger patent portfolios. Typically, licensees are small businesses or 
start-up companies that, in order to enter a given market, must license 
the patents of larger companies, who have substantial research and 
development budgets. Often, the licensing agreements group together 
a large collection of patents. These groupings can prevent the smaller 
licensee companies from examining or challenging each patent’s 
validity or applicability due to limited financial resources. High 
business risks often dissuade smaller and newer companies from 
breaching a licensing agreement in order to challenge a patent’s 
validity. A judgment of willful infringement of a patent may lead to 
treble damages or punitive damages. Arguably, the pre-MedImmune 
incentive structure punished companies who lacked power or 
financial resources by chaining them to invalid patents. 
The Court’s decision in MedImmune shifts the balance of power 
from bigger patent-owning companies to the smaller start-up 
companies that rely on obtaining licenses for patented technology.45 
Now, patent licensees may be more inclined to reevaluate the patents 
for which they are paying royalties and decide to challenge the 
validity of those patents while paying the royalties under protest. The 
Court’s holding is limited, however, because licensees must be under 
sufficient threat of litigation by the licensor in order to create a case 
or controversy before challenging the validity of the patent at issue 
via litigation. A letter threatening enforcement of obligations under a 
licensing agreement was deemed sufficient in MedImmune to create a 
controversy for purposes of Article III. Presumably, notice of 
termination of a licensing agreement would also meet this 
requirement. This could lead to an interesting situation in which a 
licensee attempts to induce a licensor to threaten suit by sending a 
notice of termination of the licensing agreement to force the licensor 
to abandon the licensing agreement or else risk a challenge to the 
patent’s validity.  
The tension between patent owners and licensees led to 
vociferous debate among the many amicus in the case. According to 
the numerous amicus briefs presented on behalf of the respondent, a 
 
 45. Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Supreme Court Favors Companies that Rely on Others’ Patents, 
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 10, 2007. 
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decision for the licensee would serve to diminish the value of 
intellectual property owned by big-branded drug makers, universities, 
and other companies.46 Amicus briefs on behalf of the respondent 
cited examples including the impact on research universities and 
other non-commercial enterprises, suggesting that substantial harm 
would ensue if licensees are permitted to challenge a patent’s validity 
without breaching the underlying licensing agreement.47 Universities 
and non-commercial research entities might become discouraged 
from licensing their inventions because they cannot afford the 
potential liability associated with a challenge to the patent’s validity. 
Because universities are major contributors to intellectual property, 
an event that dissuades them from licensing their inventions could 
harm the availability of many important technological advances. In 
other words, inventors will become wary of licensing their inventions 
and the public will suffer. 
Both MedImmune’s critics and supporters believe that the 
decision will change the nature of licensing agreements. Leading 
patent attorneys predict that patent owners may include provisions in 
their licensing agreements that will invalidate the agreement if the 
licensee challenges one of the licensed patents.48 In fact, during the 
oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that there might be 
some way of legally structuring licensing agreements to diminish the 
threat of a lawsuit by the licensee.49  
The enforceability of such contract provisions is the source of 
great debate. In the past, U.S. courts generally have favored parties’ 
private agreements that avoid or limit litigation, but covenants 
promising not to challenge the validity of a patent run counter to the 
underlying policy reasons animating the decision in MedImmune. 
However, the enforceability of such provisions was not addressed in 
the opinion, and this will most certainly be an area of contention in 
the future. 
 
 46. Patti Waldmeir, Supreme Court Acts on Patents Legal Challenges, THE FINANCIAL 
TIMES (UK), Jan. 10, 2007. 
 47. Id. 
 48. High Court Plows Barrier Generics Encounter Challenging Patents, FDA WEEK, Jan. 
12, 2007, Section 2. 
 49. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc, 127 S. Ct. 764 
(No. 05-608). 
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The Court did not determine the underlying validity of the Cabilly 
II patent, but simply gave the petitioner the right to pursue its lawsuit 
in lower courts. MedImmune, Inc., in a press release following the 
decision, promised to pursue its original complaint “vigorously” at the 
lower court level.50 
 
 50. Press Release, MedImmune, Inc., “MedImmune Issues Statement Regarding Supreme 
Court Decision” (Jan. 9, 2007), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c= 
83037&p=irol-investornewsArticle&ID=948671&highlight= (last visited January 10, 2007). 
